Abstract. Interactive Hashing has featured as an essential ingredient in protocols realizing a large variety of cryptographic tasks, notably Oblivious Transfer in the bounded memory model. In Interactive Hashing, a sender transfers a bit string to a receiver such that two strings are received, the original string and a second string that appears to be chosen at random among those distinct from the first. This paper starts by formalizing the notion of Interactive Hashing as a cryptographic primitive, disentangling it from the specifics of its various implementations. To this end, we present an application-independent set of information theoretic conditions that all Interactive Hashing protocols must ideally satisfy. We then provide a standard implementation of Interactive Hashing and use it to reduce a very standard version of Oblivious Transfer to another one which appears much weaker.
Introduction
Interactive Hashing (IH) is a cryptographic primitive that allows a sender Alice to send a bit string w to a receiver Bob who receives two output strings, labeled w 0 , w 1 according to lexicographic order. The primitive guarantees that one of the two outputs is equal to the original input. The other string is guaranteed to be effectively random, in the sense that it is chosen beyond Alice's control, even if she acts dishonestly. On the other hand, provided that from Bob's point of view w 0 , w 1 are a priori equiprobable inputs for Alice, the primitive guarantees that Bob cannot guess which of the two was the original input with probability greater than 1 /2. We remark that typically both outputs are also available to Alice. See Figure 1 .
In this article we provide a study of Interactive Hashing in the information theoretic setting and in isolation of any surrounding context. This modular approach
Interactive Hashing: An Information Theoretic Tool Fig. 1 . Interactive Hashing: the sender Alice sends string w to Bob, who receives two strings w0, w1, labeled according to lexicographic order. One of the two (in our example, w0) is equal to the input string while the other is effectively randomly chosen. Bob cannot distinguish which of the two was the original input.
allows specific implementations (protocols) of Interactive Hashing to be analyzed independently of any applications in which they appear as sub-protocols. It thus leads to a better appreciation of the power of Interactive Hashing as a cryptographic primitive in its own right.
To demonstrate the relevance of Interactive Hashing, we present an application to protocols for Oblivious Transfer (OT). Oblivious Transfer is an important primitive in modern cryptography. It was originally studied by Wiesner [Wie70] (under the name of "multiplexing"), in a paper that marked the birth of quantum cryptography and was later independently introduced to cryptography in several variations by Rabin [Rab81] and by Even, Goldreich and Lempel [EGL85]. Oblivious transfer has since become the basis for realizing a broad class of cryptographic protocols, such as bit commitment, zero-knowledge proofs, and general secure multiparty computation [Yao86, GMW87, Kil88, Gol04] .
In a one-out-of-two Oblivious Transfer, denoted 2 1 -OT, a sender owns two secret bits b 0 and b 1 , and a receiver wants to learn b c for a secret bit c of his choice. The sender will only collaborate if the receiver can obtain information about exclusively one of b 0 or b 1 . Likewise, the receiver will only participate provided that the sender cannot obtain any information about c.
Organization of the Paper
We present the previous work on Interactive Hashing in Section 2. In Section 3 we identify and formalize the information theoretic security properties of Interactive Hashing. Then, in Section 3.1 we turn our attention to the Interactive Hashing implementation that appeared as a sub-protocol in [OVY93] and refer the reader to recent work [Sav07,CCMS09] demonstrating that despite its simplicity, it meets all security properties set forth in Section 3. This new proof of security is an important improvement over the proof that appeared in [CCM98] , where the authors demonstrate that a slight variant of the IH protocol of [OVY93] could be securely used in their specific scenario. The new proof is more general, as it is based on the security properties stated in Section 3. Moreover, the proof is significantly simpler and more intuitive. Lastly, it provides an easier to use and much tighter upper bound on the probability that the protocol fails to ensure
